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Abstract. This is an invited contribution to the discussion on Profes-
sor Deborah Mayo’s paper, “On the Birnbaum argument for the strong
likelihood principle,” to appear in Statistical Science. Mayo clearly
demonstrates that statistical methods violating the likelihood principle
need not violate either the sufficiency or conditionality principle, thus
refuting Birnbaum’s claim. With the constraints of Birnbaum’s theo-
rem lifted, we revisit the foundations of statistical inference, focusing
on some new foundational principles, the inferential model framework,
and connections with sufficiency and conditioning.
Key words and phrases: Birnbaum, conditioning, dimension reduc-
tion, inferential model, likelihood principle.
1. INTRODUCTION
Birnbaum’s theorem (Birnbaum, 1962) is ar-
guably the most controversial result in statistics.
The theorem’s conclusion is that a framework for
statistical inference that satisfies two natural con-
ditions, namely, the sufficiency principle (SP) and
the conditionality principle (CP), must also sat-
isfy an exclusive condition, the likelihood principle
(LP). The controversy lies in the fact that LP ex-
cludes all those standard methods taught in Stat 101
courses. Professor Mayo successfully refutes Birn-
baum’s claim, showing that violations of LP need
not imply violations of SP or CP. The key to Mayo’s
argument is a correct formulation of CP; see also
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Evans (2013). Her demonstration resolves the con-
troversy around Birnbaum and LP, helping to put
the statisticians’ house in order.
The controversy and confusion surrounding Birn-
baum’s claim has perhaps discouraged researchers
from considering questions about the foundations of
statistics. We view Professor Mayo’s paper as an in-
vitation for statisticians to revisit these fundamental
questions, and we are grateful for the opportunity
to contribute to this discussion.
Though LP no longer constrains the frequentist
approach, this does not mean that pure frequentism
is necessarily correct. For example, reproducibility
issues1 in large-scale studies is an indication that
the frequentist techniques that have been successful
in classical problems may not be appropriate for to-
day’s high-dimensional problems. We contend that
something more than the basic sampling model is
required for valid statistical inference, and appropri-
ate conditioning is one aspect of this. Here we con-
sider what a new framework, called inferential mod-
els (IMs), has to say concerning the foundations of
statistical inference, with a focus on something more
fundamental than CP and SP. For this, we begin in
Section 2 with a discussion of valid probabilistic in-
ference as motivation for the IM framework. A gen-
1“Announcement: Reducing our irreproducibility,” Nature
496 (2013), DOI:10.1038/496398a.
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eral efficiency principle is presented in Section 3 and
we give an IM-based dimension reduction strategy
that accomplishes what the classical SP and CP set
out to do. Section 4 gives some concluding remarks.
2. VALID PROBABILISTIC INFERENCE
2.1 A Validity Principle
The sampling model for observable data X , de-
pending on an unknown parameter θ, is the famil-
iar starting point. Our claim is that the sampling
model alone is not sufficient for valid probabilistic
inference. By “probabilistic inference” we mean a
framework whereby any assertion/hypothesis about
the unknown parameter has a (predictive) probabil-
ity attached to it after data is observed. The sam-
pling model facilitates a comparison of the chances
of the event X = x on different probability spaces.
For probabilistic inference, there must be a known
distribution available, after data is observed. The
random element that corresponds to this distribu-
tion shall be called a predictable quantity, and prob-
abilistic inference is obtained by predicting this pre-
dictable quantity after seeing data. The probabilistic
inference is “valid” if the predictive probabilities are
suitably calibrated or, equivalently, have a fixed and
known scale for meaningful interpretation. Without
risk of confusion, we shall call the prediction of the
predictable quantity valid if it admits valid proba-
bilistic inference. We summarize this in the following
validity principle (VP).
Validity principle. Probabilistic inference re-
quires associating an unobservable but predictable
quantity with the observable data and unknown pa-
rameter. Probabilities to be used for inference are
obtained by valid prediction of the predictable quan-
tity.
The frequentist approach aims at developing pro-
cedures, such as confidence intervals and testing
rules, having long-run frequency properties. Expres-
sions like “95% confidence” have no predictive prob-
ability interpretation after data is observed, so fre-
quentist methods are not probabilistic in our sense.
Nevertheless, certain frequentist quantities, such as
p-values, may be justifiable from a valid probabilis-
tic inference point of view (Martin and Liu, 2014b).
When genuine prior information is available and
can be summarized as a usual probability model,
the corresponding Bayesian inference is both prob-
abilistic and valid [see Martin and Liu (2014a), Re-
mark 4]. When no genuine prior information is avail-
able, and a default prior distribution is used, the
validity property is questionable. Probability match-
ing priors, Bernstein–von Mises theorems, etc., are
efforts to make posterior inference valid, in the sense
above, at least approximately. The standard in-
terpretation of these results is, for example, that
Bayesian credible intervals have the nominal fre-
quentist coverage probability asymptotically; see
Fraser (2011). In that case, the remarks above con-
cerning frequentist methods apply.
Fiducial inference was introduced by Fisher (1930)
to avoid using artificial priors in scientific infer-
ence. Subsequent work includes structural inference
(Fraser, 1968), the Dempster–Shafer theory of belief
functions (Shafer (1976); Dempster (2008)), gener-
alized inference (Chiang (2001); Weerahandi (1993))
and generalized fiducial inference (Hannig, 2009,
2013). Fiducial distributions are defined by express-
ing the parameter as a data-dependent function of a
pivotal quantity. This results in a bona fide posterior
distribution only in Fraser’s structural models and,
in those cases, it corresponds to a Bayesian posterior
(Lindley (1958); Taraldsen and Lindqvist (2013)).
Therefore, the fiducial distribution is meaningful
when the corresponding Bayesian prior is meaning-
ful in the sense above. More on fiducial from the IM
perspective is given below.
2.2 IM Framework
The IM framework, proposed recently by Mar-
tin and Liu (2013), has its roots in fiducial and
Dempster–Shafer theory; see also Martin, Zhang
and Liu (2010). At a fundamental level, the IM ap-
proach is driven by VP. Here is a quick overview.
Write the sampling model/data-generating mech-
anism as
X = a(θ,U), U ∼ PU ,(1)
where X ∈ X is the observable data, θ ∈ Θ is the
unknown parameter, and U ∈ U is an unobservable
auxiliary variable with known distribution PU . Fol-
lowing VP, the goal is to use the data X and the
distribution for U for meaningful probabilistic infer-
ence on θ without assuming a prior. The following
three steps describe the IM construction.
A-step. Associate the observed data X = x, the
parameter and the auxiliary variable via (1) and
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construct the set-valued mapping, given by
Θx(u) = {θ :x= a(θ,u)}, u ∈U.
The fiducial approach considers the distribution of
Θx(U) as a function of U ∼ PU . The IM framework,
on the other hand, predicts the unobserved U using
a random set.
P-step. Predict the unobservable U with a ran-
dom set S . The distribution PS of S is required to
be valid in the sense that
f(U)≥st Unif(0,1),(2)
where f(u) = PS(S ∋ u) and ≥st means “stochasti-
cally no smaller than.”
C-step. Combine Θx(·) and S as Θx(S) =⋃
u∈S
Θx(u). For a given assertion A ⊆ Θ, evalu-
ate the evidence in x for and not against the claim
“θ ∈A” via the belief and plausibility functions:
belx(A) = PS{Θx(S)⊆A},
plx(A) = PS{Θx(S)∩A 6=∅}.
In cases where Θx(S) is empty with positive PS -
probability, some adjustments to the above formulas
are needed; see Martin and Liu (2013).
The IM output is the pair of functions (belx,plx)
and, when applied to an assertion A about the pa-
rameter θ of interest, these provide a (personal)
probabilistic summary of the evidence in dataX = x
supporting the truthfulness of A. Property (2) guar-
antees that the IM output is valid. Our focus in the
remainder of the discussion will be on the A-step
and, in particular, auxiliary variable dimension re-
duction. Such concerns about dimensionality are es-
sential for efficient inference on θ. These are also
closely tied to the classical ideas of sufficiency and
conditionality.
We end this section with a few remarks on fiducial.
If one takes the predictive random set S in the P-
step as a singleton, that is, S = {U}, where U ∼ PU ,
then belx and plx are equal and equal to the fiducial
distribution. In this sense, fiducial provides proba-
bilistic inference. However, the singleton predictive
random set is not valid in the sense of (2), so fiducial
inference is generally not valid, violating the second
part of VP. One can also reconstruct the fiducial
distribution by choosing a valid predictive random
set S so that belx(A) equals the fiducial probability
of A for all suitable A⊆Θ. But this would generally
require that S depend on the observed X = x, and
the resulting inference suffers from a selection bias,
or double-use of the data, resulting in unjustifiably
large belief probabilities.
3. EFFICIENCY AND DIMENSION
REDUCTION
3.1 An Efficiency Principle
It is natural to strive for efficient statistical infer-
ence. In the context of IMs, we want plX(A) to be
as stochastically small as possible, as a function of
X , when the assertion A about θ is false. To connect
this to classical efficiency, plX(A) can be interpreted
like the p-value for testing H0 : θ ∈ A, so stochasti-
cally small plausibility when A is false corresponds
to the high power of the test. We state the following
efficiency principle (EP).
Efficiency principle. Subject to the validity
constraint, probabilistic inference should be made as
efficient as possible.
EP is purposefully vague: it allows for a variety
of techniques to be employed to increase efficiency.
The next section discusses one important technique
related to auxiliary variable dimension reduction.
3.2 Improved Efficiency via Dimension Reduction
In the classical setting, sufficiency reduces the
data to a good summary statistic. In the IM con-
text, however, the dimension of the auxiliary vari-
able, not the data, is of primary concern. For exam-
ple, in the case of iid sampling, the dimension of U is
the same as that of X , which is usually greater than
that of θ. In such cases, it is inefficient to predict a
high-dimensional auxiliary variable for inference on
a lower dimensional parameter. The idea is to re-
duce the dimension of U to that of θ. This auxiliary
variable dimension reduction will indirectly result in
some transformation of the data.
How to reduce the dimension of U? We seek a new
auxiliary variable V , of the same dimension of θ,
such that the baseline association (1) can be rewrit-
ten as
T (X) = b(θ,V ), V ∼ PV ,(3)
for some functions T and b, and distribution PV .
Here PV may actually depend on some features of
the data X . Such a dimension reduction is gen-
eral, but Martin and Liu (2014a) consider an im-
portant case, which we summarize here. Suppose
we have two one-to-one mappings, x 7→ (T (x),H(x))
and u 7→ (τ(u), η(u)), with the requirement that
η(U) = H(X). Since H(X) is observable, so too
must be the feature η(U) of U . This point has two
important consequences: first, a feature of U that
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is observed need not be predicted, hence a dimen-
sion reduction; second, the feature of U that is ob-
served naturally provides some information about
the part that remains unobserved, so conditioning
should help improve prediction. By construction, the
baseline association (1) is equivalent to
T (X) = b(θ, τ(U)) and H(X) = η(U),(4)
and this suggests an association of the form (3),
where V = τ(U) and PV is the conditional distri-
bution of τ(U) given η(U) =H(X).
It remains to discuss how the dimension reduction
strategy described above related to EP. The follow-
ing theorem gives one relatively simple illustration
of the improved efficiency via dimension reduction.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the baseline associ-
ation (1) can be rewritten as (4) and that τ(U)
and η(U) are independent. Then inference based on
T (X) = b(θ, τ(U)) alone, by a valid prediction of
τ(U), ignoring η(U), is at least as efficient as infer-
ence from (4) by a valid prediction of (τ(U), η(U)).
See the corollary to Proposition 1 in Martin and
Liu (2014a, full-length version); see also Liu and
Martin (2015). Therefore, reducing the dimension of
the auxiliary variable cannot make inference less ef-
ficient. The point in that paper is that reducing the
dimension actually improves efficiency, hence EP.
In the standard examples, for example, regular ex-
ponential families, our dimension reduction above
corresponds to classical sufficiency; see Example 1.
Outside the standard examples, the IM dimension
reduction gives something different from sufficiency,
in particular, the former often leads directly to fur-
ther dimension reduction compared to the latter;
see Example 2. That the IM dimension reduction
naturally contains some form of conditioning is an
advantage. The absence of conditioning in the stan-
dard definition of sufficiency is one possible reason
why conditional inference has yet to become part of
the mainstream. The IM framework also has advan-
tages beyond dimension reduction and conditioning.
In particular, the IM output gives valid prior-free
probabilistic inference on θ.
3.3 “Dimension Reduction Entails SP and CP”
This section draws some connections between the
IM dimension reduction above and SP and CP.
First, it is clear that following the auxiliary vari-
able dimension reduction strategy described above
entails CP. In the Cox example, the randomization
that determines which measurement instrument will
be used corresponds to an auxiliary variable whose
value is observed completely. So, our auxiliary vari-
able dimension reduction strategy implies condition-
ing on the actual instrument used, hence CP. For
SP, Theorem 1 gives some insight. That is, when a
sufficient statistic has dimension the same as θ, one
can take T (X) as that sufficient statistic and select
independent τ(U) and η(U). In general, our dimen-
sion reduction and efficiency considerations are more
meaningful than sufficiency and SP. The examples
below illustrate this point further.
Example 1. Suppose X1,X2 are independent
N(θ,1) samples, and write the association as Xi =
θ+Ui, where U1,U2 are independent standard nor-
mal. In this case, there are lots of candidate map-
pings (τ, η) to rewrite the baseline association in
the form (4). Two choices are {τ(u) = u1, η(u) =
u2− u1} and {τ(u) = u¯, η(u) = (u1 − u¯, u2− u¯)}. At
first look, the second choice, corresponding to suf-
ficiency, seems better than the first. However, the
dimension-reduced associations (3) based on these
two choices are exactly the same. This means, first,
there is nothing special about sufficiency in light
of proper conditioning (Evans, Fraser and Monette
(1986); Fraser (2004)). Second, it suggests that, at
least in simple problems, the dimension-reduced as-
sociation (3) does not depend on the choice of (τ, η),
that is, it only depends on the sufficient statistic,
hence SP. The message here holds more generally,
though a rigorous formulation remains to be worked
out.
Example 2. Consider independent exponential
random variables X1,X2, the first with mean θ and
the second with mean θ−1. In this case, the mini-
mal sufficient statistic, (X1,X2), is two-dimensional
while the parameter is one-dimensional. Martin and
Liu (2014a) take the baseline association as X1 =
θU1 and X2 = θ
−1U2, where U1,U2 are independent
standard exponential. They employ a novel partial
differential equations technique to identify a func-
tion η of (U1,U2) whose value is fully observed, so
that only a scalar auxiliary variable needs to be pre-
dicted. Their solution is equivalent to that based on
the conditional distribution of the maximum like-
lihood estimate given an ancillary statistic (Fisher
(1973); Ghosh, Reid and Fraser (2010)). The mes-
sage here is that the IM-based auxiliary variable di-
mension reduction strategy does something similar
to the classical strategy of conditioning on ancillary
statistics, but it does so in a mostly automatic way.
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Professor Mayo is to be congratulated for her
contribution. Besides resolving the controversy sur-
rounding Birnbaum’s theorem, her paper is an in-
vitation for a fresh discussion on the foundations
of statistical inference. Though LP no longer con-
strains the frequentist approach, we have argued
here that something more than the basic sampling
model is required for valid statistical inference. The
IM framework features the prediction of unobserved
auxiliary variables as this “something more,” and
the idea of reducing the dimension of the auxiliary
variable before prediction leads to improved effi-
ciency, accomplishing what SP and CP are meant
to do. We expect further developments for and from
IMs in years to come.
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